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Product Liability

Preemption
The U.S. Supreme Court preemption ruling in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,
which generally shields generic drug manufacturers from state-law damages liability for
design-defect claims, may also have implications for preemption jurisprudence more
broadly, attorneys Brian Wolfman and Anne King say in this BNA Insight. The authors analyze the decision, offer guidance on how plaintiffs injured by defective or mislabeled generic
prescription drugs may seek compensation after Mutual, and explain how federal regulators and Congress may respond.

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and Its Implications
n June 24, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held 5–4
in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett1 that federal law preempted a state-law design-defect damages claim against a manufacturer of generic prescription drugs. Mutual follows on the heels of two related
Supreme Court rulings, Wyeth v. Levine,2 decided in
2009, and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,3 decided in 2011. In
Wyeth, the Court held that federal law generally does
not preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims against
manufacturers of brand-name prescription drugs.4 In
PLIVA, however, the Court concluded that federal law
generally does preempt failure-to-warn claims against
manufacturers of generic prescription drugs because
federal law prohibits generic manufacturers from unilaterally amending their drug labels, and instead requires them invariably to use the label of the brandname drug on which the generic product is based.5
This article describes the Supreme Court’s decision
in Mutual and evaluates how it may affect future products liability litigation. Part I provides an overview of
the case’s factual background and of federal generic
drug regulation, while Part II discusses the Court’s majority opinion and the dissents. Part III analyzes the im-
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2
plications of the decision, offering ideas on how plaintiffs injured by defective or mislabeled generic prescription drugs may seek compensation after Mutual and
how federal regulators and Congress may respond. Part
III also briefly assesses Mutual’s potential impact on
federal preemption doctrine.

I. Background
A. The Facts
In December 2004, Karen Bartlett received a prescription for the brand-name drug Clinoril to relieve
shoulder pain.6 Clinoril is a non-steroidal antiinflammatory drug (NSAID) prescribed to alleviate
muscle pain.7 Other NSAIDs include ibuprofen (Advil)
and naproxen (Aleve).8 Ms. Bartlett’s pharmacist dispensed sulindac, a generic version of Clinoril, manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceutical (Mutual).9 New Hampshire law allows pharmacists to substitute a generic version for a prescribed brand-name drug.10 All 50 states
and the District of Columbia have enacted generic substitution laws authorizing or, in some cases, mandating
that pharmacists dispense a generic drug even when a
doctor has prescribed the brand name.11
For Ms. Bartlett, the results of taking sulindac were
‘‘horrific.’’12 In early 2005, she developed StevensJohnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis
(SJS/TEN), related conditions characterized by ‘‘extensive loss of skin.’’13 Ms. Bartlett was ‘‘severely disfigured,’’ with ‘‘sixty to sixty-five percent of the surface of
[her] body deteriorated, . . . burned off, or turned into
an open wound.’’14 SJS/TEN also adversely affects a patient’s mucous membranes, and Ms. Bartlett’s extensive
injuries included damage to her eyes, rendering her legally blind, burns to her esophagus that required a year
of tube feeding, and damage to her vagina and lungs.15
Ms. Bartlett’s treatment included a medically-induced
coma and numerous surgeries.16
Ms. Bartlett sued Mutual alleging state-law damages
claims, including a design-defect claim.17 As explained
in more detail below, Mutual argued that Ms. Bartlett’s
design-defect claim was preempted by federal law.

B. FDA Regulation of Generic Drugs
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), a drug manufacturer wanting to sell a new
drug in interstate commerce must submit a new drug
application (NDA) for approval by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).18 Because FDA may approve a

drug for sale only if the drug is deemed ‘‘safe for use’’
under ‘‘the conditions of use prescribed, recommended,
or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof,’’ an NDA
must include clinical trial results and other data showing that the drug is safe and effective.19 The Court in
Mutual characterized the NDA process as ‘‘onerous and
lengthy.’’20 A drug approved through the NDA process
is often referred to as a ‘‘brand-name’’ or ‘‘listed’’ drug.
In 1984, Congress amended the FDCA by enacting
the Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.21 HatchWaxman established an alternative, less demanding approval process for generic copies of brand-name drugs.
Manufacturers seeking to market a generic drug may
submit an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
instead of an NDA. An ANDA must indicate that the generic drug’s prescribed, recommended, or suggested
uses match those of a previously approved, listed drug,
that the generic is ‘‘bioequivalent’’ to the listed drug,
and that the generic’s labeling is the same as the listed
drug’s labeling.22
As noted earlier, in PLIVA, it was this sameness-inlabeling requirement, coupled with the Court’s conclusion that federal law prohibits generic drug manufacturers from unilaterally altering their drug labels, that
prompted the Court to hold that federal law preempts a
failure-to-warn claim against the manufacturer of a generic drug.23 Hatch-Waxman has resulted in significantly broader access to generic drugs, increasing generics’ market share from 19 percent at the time of enactment to 75 percent in 2009.24 When a brand-name
drug has a generic equivalent, the generic generally
captures 90 percent of the market.25

C. Regulatory History of Clinoril/Sulindac
The following summary of the regulatory history of
Clinoril and sulindac is taken from Karen Bartlett’s Supreme Court brief and from reported decisions in the
case. FDA approved the brand-name drug Clinoril in
1978.26 At that time, clinical trial results assessed Clinoril’s negative side effects as ‘‘relatively mild.’’27 FDA approved Mutual Pharmaceutical’s ANDA for generic
sulindac in 1991.28
When Ms. Bartlett was prescribed sulindac in 2004,
Mutual’s label listed SJS/TEN as ‘‘a possible adverse reaction.’’29 In 2005, FDA recommended removal of the
NSAID Bextra from the market based on Bextra’s risk
of severe skin reactions such as SJS/TEN.30 In 2006, in
response to a citizen petition, FDA recommended that
NSAID manufacturers list SJS/TEN ‘‘in the ‘Warnings’
section of the prescription labels.’’31 Mutual then
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Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
Brief of Respondent Karen Bartlett, at 5, 10, Mutual
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, No. 12-142 (U.S. filed Feb. 13, 2012)
(hereafter ‘‘Resp. Br.’’), available at 2013 WL 602909, *5, *10.
8
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2471.
9
Id. at 2472.
10
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 318:47-d.
11
See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
12
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
13
Resp. Br. 5, 7, available at 2013 WL 602909, *5, *7.
14
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
15
Id.; Bartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 36, 43 (1st
Cir. 2012); Resp. Br. 8, available at 2013 WL 602909, *8.
16
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2472; Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 43; Resp.
Br. 8, available at 2013 WL 602909, *8.
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Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
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See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) - (d).
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21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (d).
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2471.
21
98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 USC 355(j)).
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21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) & (iv)-(v).
23
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577-78.
24
Id. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
25
Id.
26
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2471; Resp. Br. 5.
27
Resp. Br. 5, available at 2013 WL 602909, *5.
28
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2471; Resp. Br. 5, available at 2013
WL 602909, *5.
29
Resp. Br. 7, available at 2013 WL 602909, *7.
30
Id. at 6, available at 2013 WL 602909, *6.
31
Resp. Br. 7, available at 2013 WL 602909, *7. However,
‘‘FDA rejected the Citizen Petition’s request for an even stronger ‘boxed warning.’ ’’ Id.
20

COPYRIGHT 姝 2013 BY THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.

LW

ISSN 0148-8139

3
changed its sulindac label to list SJS/TEN in the ‘‘Warnings’’ section rather than just as a possible adverse reaction.32
FDA data on adverse patient reactions to sulindac included ‘‘89 reports of SJS/TEN from 1980 to 1997, increasing to 134 by 2004; 39 cases of death; and one of
the highest SJS/TEN reporting rates among NSAIDs.’’33

D. Lower Court Proceedings
Ms. Bartlett’s suit against Mutual sought damages
under New Hampshire tort law, claiming that Mutual
had failed adequately to warn of sulindac’s hazards and
that sulindac was defectively designed.34 The district
court dismissed Ms. Bartlett’s failure-to-warn claim because the prescribing physician acknowledged that he
had not read the applicable warning.35 However, Ms.
Bartlett’s design-defect claim proceeded to trial, where
a jury found in her favor and awarded her $21.06 million in compensatory damages.36
Mutual appealed, arguing that the FDCA and its
regulations preempted Ms. Bartlett’s design-defect
claim under PLIVA.37 The First Circuit affirmed the jury
verdict, distinguishing PLIVA on the rationale that Mutual could comply with state law by choosing not to
market sulindac in New Hampshire and that, therefore,
a state-law determination that sulindac was defectively
designed did not conflict with the federal requirement
that sulindac be sold as formulated when approved by
FDA.38 Moreover, the First Circuit noted, the Supreme
Court had ‘‘adopted a general no-preemption rule in
Wyeth [v. Levine].’’39

II. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court ruled 5–4 in favor of Mutual, reversing the First Circuit and holding that ‘‘state-law
design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a
drug’s warnings are preempted by federal law under
PLIVA.’’40 Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion,
joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Breyer dissented,
joined by Justice Kagan, and Justice Sotomayor wrote a
separate dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg.

A. Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion
1. Assessing Mutual’s Duties Under State and
Federal Law
After providing an overview of the factual and legal
background of the case, Justice Alito briefly summarized the Court’s preemption doctrine, which is derived
from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.41 Jus-

tice Alito explained that ‘‘it has long been settled that
state laws that conflict with federal law are without effect.’’42 Congress may state explicitly that federal law
preempts state law, but a conflict may also arise ‘‘[e]ven
in the absence of an express preemption provision.’’43
For example, Justice Alito went on, impossibility preemption arises ‘‘where it is impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal requirements.’’44
And, obstacle preemption occurs where, even though
compliance with state law does not render compliance
with federal law impossible, state law nonetheless
‘‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal
objectives.’’45
Here, the Court focused on impossibility preemption,
evaluating whether it was possible for Mutual to comply simultaneously with New Hampshire law and federal drug regulations. The Court first considered
whether New Hampshire state law imposed a duty on
Mutual and other drug manufacturers. After answering
that question affirmatively, the Court analyzed the nature of Mutual’s state-law duty. Then, the Court assessed Mutual’s duty under federal law and concluded
that the drug manufacturer’s federal-law and state-law
duties conflicted.
In determining that New Hampshire’s design-defect
cause of action imposes an affirmative duty on Mutual
and other drug manufacturers, the Court reasoned that
New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action creates
strict liability, not absolute liability.46 The former, the
Court explained, imposes an affirmative duty on manufacturers, while the latter ‘‘merely serves to spread
risk.’’47 The Court thus rejected Ms. Bartlett’s argument
that New Hampshire law does not impose a duty because strict liability for selling a product in ‘‘defective
condition’’ attaches ‘‘even though [the manufacturer]
‘has exercised all possible care.’ ’’48 The Court interpreted New Hampshire court decisions as imposing a
duty on manufacturers to design products ‘‘reasonably
safely’’ for foreseeable uses.49 The Court left open the
question whether a ‘‘true absolute-liability’’ tort regime
would give rise to preemption.50 That question is important, at least in theory, because an absolute-liability
scheme that serves only to spread risk may not give rise
to a state-law duty that would conflict with a federallaw duty.51 We take up that issue in more detail in Part
III.B.1.
The Court then turned in more detail to Mutual’s duty
under New Hampshire law. The majority characterized
New Hampshire law as applying a ‘‘risk-utility’’ balancing test to determine whether a product is ‘‘unreasonably dangerous,’’ and identified three factors New
Hampshire courts typically weigh in the risk-utility inquiry: the product’s ‘‘usefulness,’’ its ‘‘risk of danger,’’

32

Id.
Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 39.
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
35
Id.; Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34. The district court’s dismissal
of the failure-to-warn claim came in 2010, prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in PLIVA, which generally eliminated failureto-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers on preemption grounds.
36
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2472; Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 35.
37
Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 38.
40
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
41
U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
33
34
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Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
43
See id. at 2473 (majority opinion).
44
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
45
Id. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See id. at 2473; Resp. Br. 19-21, available at 2013 WL
602909, *19-*21.
49
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 395 A. 2d 843, 847 (N.H. 1978)).
50
Id. at 2474 n.1.
51
See id. at 2473.
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4
and ‘‘the presence and efficacy of a warning.’’52 Therefore, the Court concluded, Mutual could satisfy its statelaw duty to ensure that its products are not unreasonably dangerous only ‘‘by changing a drug’s design’’—to
increase the drug’s usefulness or to decrease its risk of
danger—or by changing its labeling.’’53
Having defined Mutual’s state-law duty, the Court
then considered whether the drug manufacturer could
simultaneously carry out that duty and comply with federal law. The majority noted that, as explained in
PLIVA, the FDCA and its regulations prohibit generic
drug manufacturers from unilaterally changing their labels.54 The FDCA, the Court explained, also does not
authorize generic manufacturers to alter the composition of their products because approval depends on bioequivalency with a listed (brand-name) drug.55 (Further, Justice Alito noted, it would not have even been
possible to change sulindac’s composition because of
its simple molecular make-up.56)
Because New Hampshire law required Mutual to
change either sulindac’s composition or its label to
avoid liability, the Court said, it was impossible for Mutual to comply with both state and federal law.57 Therefore, the Court held, ‘‘New Hampshire’s warning-based
design-defect cause of action is pre-empted with respect
to FDA-approved drugs sold in interstate commerce.’’58

2. PLIVA as Controlling Precedent
In the second part of its opinion, invoking PLIVA, the
Court explained more expansively why it disagreed
with the First Circuit and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent.
As noted earlier, the First Circuit had concluded that
Ms. Bartlett’s suit was not barred by impossibility preemption because Mutual could avoid a state law-federal
law conflict by suspending sulindac sales. By pulling
the product from the market, the argument goes, Mutual would not violate any federal duty because federal
law only allows, but does not require, the holder of an
approved drug application to market its approved product.
The Supreme Court ‘‘reject[ed] this ‘stop-selling’ rationale as incompatible with [its] pre-emption jurisprudence,’’ reasoning that it would render impossibility
preemption ‘‘all but meaningless.’’59 ‘‘In every instance
in which the Court has found impossibility preemption,’’ Justice Alito wrote, ‘‘the ‘direct conflict’ between federal- and state-law duties could easily have
been avoided if the regulated actor had simply ceased
acting.’’ For this proposition, the majority cited
PLIVA—and only PLIVA—pointing out that although it
would have been possible for the drug manufacturers in
that case to stop selling their generic drug products, the
Court nevertheless found impossibility preemption.60
The Court also drew on PLIVA in addressing arguments raised in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Her dissent, Justice Alito complained, incorrectly characterized New Hampshire common law as simply creating
52
Id. at 2474-75 (citing Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Industries, Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182 (N.H. 2001)).
53
Id. at 2474.
54
Id. at 2476.
55
Id. at 2475.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 2476-77.
58
Id. at 2477.
59
Id. at 2477 (quoting PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2579).
60
Id. at 2478 (citing PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577-78).
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an incentive for manufacturers to alter drug composition or labeling. Rather, he said, ‘‘common-law’’ duties
have the same effect as ‘‘statutory mandates’’: They require a manufacturer ‘‘to choose between leaving the
market and accepting the consequences of its actions.’’61 Here, the Court noted that PLIVA also involved
state common-law duties that were held to conflict with
federal law.62

B. Dissent (Justice Breyer)
Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justice Kagan, reasoned that impossibility preemption did not apply because it was not ‘‘literally impossible’’ for Mutual to
comply with both federal and state law.63 Mutual had
the option to comply with state law by withdrawing
from the New Hampshire market or continuing to market sulindac and pay tort remedies assessed against it.64
However, Justice Breyer suggested that obstacle
preemption—which asks whether state law ‘‘stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal
objectives’’65—could arise in some cases (although not
in Ms. Bartlett’s case) where compliance with state law
requires either removal of a drug from a market or payment of tort remedies and where those requirements
were ‘‘so harmful that [they] would seriously undercut
the purposes of the federal statutory scheme.’’66 ‘‘The
more medically valuable the drug,’’ Justice Breyer explained, ‘‘the less likely Congress intended to permit a
State to drive it from the marketplace.’’67
Justice Breyer’s dissent also discussed why he would
not defer to FDA’s position, expressed in the Solicitor
General’s Mutual amicus brief, that federal law preempted Ms. Bartlett’s state-law design-defect claim.
FDA argued that PLIVA was controlling because New
Hampshire’s design-defect law ‘‘includes a state-law
duty to provide warnings,’’ which conflicted with the
federal-law requirement that prohibits generic manufacturers
from
making
‘‘independent
labeling
changes.’’68
Normally, Justice Breyer explained, he would give an
agency’s position special weight in assessing preemption ‘‘[w]here the statute’’—like the FDCA—‘‘contains
no clear pre-emption command’’ because, in that circumstance, ‘‘courts may infer that the administrative
agency has a degree of leeway to determine the extent
to which governing statutes, rules, regulations, or other
administrative actions have pre-emptive effect.’’69 But
in Mutual, the agency’s position was expressed only in
its amicus brief and was not based on agency hearings
or other public input or developed ‘‘in regulations, interpretations, or similar agency work product.’’70 Moreover, in Justice Breyer’s view, FDA had flip-flopped on
‘‘the general matter’’ of tort preemption ‘‘in different
61

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2480-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64
Id. at 2481.
65
Id. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
66
Id. at 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 2481.
68
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner in Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, at 12, No. 12-142
(U.S. filed Jan. 22, 2013), available at 2013 WL 314460, *12.
69
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70
Id. (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 212-13 (1988); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000)).
62
63
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briefs filed at different times,’’71 further undermining
any basis for deference.

C. Dissent (Justice Sotomayor)
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent characterized the majority opinion as broadening the Court’s ‘‘traditionally narrow’’ impossibility preemption doctrine.72 Her dissent
opened by outlining ‘‘two cornerstones of our preemption jurisprudence’’: that congressional purpose is
the doctrine’s ‘‘ultimate touchstone,’’ and the presumption against preemption,73 which is based in the ‘‘assumption that the historic police power of the States’’ is
not ‘‘superseded’’ by federal law ‘‘unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’’74
Justice Sotomayor highlighted these two cornerstones in her overview of impossibility preemption,
which she characterized as a ‘‘demanding defense’’ requiring an ‘‘uphill climb’’ for Mutual.75 Courts may find
that Congress intended federal law to preempt state
law, she explained, only where there is a ‘‘direct conflict
between two mutually incompatible legal requirements.’’76 Therefore, ‘‘impossibility does not exist
where one sovereign’s laws merely create an incentive
to take an action that the other sovereign has not authorized because it is possible to comply with both laws.’’77
Turning to Ms. Bartlett’s case, Justice Sotomayor
concluded that, contrary to the majority’s understanding, New Hampshire law did not require Mutual to
change the drug’s design or label. Justice Sotomayor
explained that ‘‘[t]o determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous’’ under New Hampshire law, ‘‘a
jury is asked to make a risk-benefit assessment by considering a nonexhaustive list of factors,’’ not only the
three factors the majority had identified (‘‘usefulness,’’
‘‘risk of danger,’’ and ‘‘the presence and efficacy of a
warning’’).78 Therefore, although New Hampshire law
may create incentives for drug manufacturers to change
a product’s composition or label, it does not mandate
that manufacturers do so.79 In fact, Justice Sotomayor
noted, a manufacturer has multiple options when faced
with strict liability, including changing the design or label, removing the drug from the market, and/or paying
compensation.80
After questioning the Court’s interpretation of state
law, Justice Sotomayor explained that the majority’s
characterization of federal law also missed the mark. In
Justice Sotomayor’s view, the Court’s opinion mistakenly ‘‘rel[ied] principally on an implicit assumption
about rights conferred by federal premarket approval
under the FDCA.’’81 There is no right, she continued,
under federal law to ‘‘continue to sell a drug free from
71
Id. at 2481-82 (citing FDA’s anti-preemption views in
Wyeth and PLIVA and pro-preemption view in Mutual).
72
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2494, 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 2483 (citations omitted).
74
Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
75
Id. at 2485 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573).
76
Id. at 2486.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see id. at 2474-75
(majority opinion).
79
Id. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
80
Id. at 2491.
81
Id. at 2490.
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liability once it has been approved’’ by FDA.82 For that
reason, states have the power to impose on manufacturers the choice to either remove their product from the
market or pay compensation ‘‘to protect [their] citizens
from dangerous drugs or at least ensure that seriously
injured consumers receive compensation.’’83
Justice Sotomayor also observed that the majority
made assumptions about the relationship between federal and state law in promoting drug safety without examining congressional purpose.84 Instead, she wrote,
the Court ‘‘effectively’’ ‘‘treat[ed] the FDA as the sole
guardian of drug safety’’ without examining whether
Congress intended that FDA ‘‘set a maximum safety
threshold (in which case state tort law would undermine [congressional] purpose)’’ or a ‘‘minimal safety
threshold’’ that may be supplemented by state law.85

III. Mutual’s Future Effect
Just as PLIVA immunized generic drug manufacturers facing failure-to-warn claims from state-law damages liability, Mutual will do the same for design-defect
claims (with potential exceptions discussed below in
Part III.B). Mutual also underscores the need for regulatory or congressional action that has been evident at
least since PLIVA. The Court’s ruling in Mutual may
also have implications for preemption jurisprudence
more generally. We address these issues in turn.

A. Design Defect Claims Against Generic
Drug Manufacturers Generally
Mutual’s principal effect is to immunize generic prescription drug manufacturers from most, if not all,
state-law design-defect claims. The Court’s initial rendition of its holding—‘‘that state-law design-defect claims
that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are preempted by federal law under PLIVA’’86—could be
viewed as limited to a warning-related subset of designdefect claims. On this reading, what we will call a
‘‘pure’’ design-defect claim—one that turns solely on
the assertion that the manufacturer should have used
an alternative design or should not have marketed the
product at all, and, thus, does not rely on alleged inadequacies in the product’s label—would not be affected
by the Court’s ruling.
But Mutual’s reasoning is not so limited. According
to the Mutual majority, Ms. Bartlett’s claim necessarily
turned on the label’s inadequacy because both sulindac’s ‘‘basic chemistry’’ and ‘‘federal law’’ rendered
Mutual ‘‘unable to change sulindac’s composition.’’87
Perhaps the chemistry of a drug more complex than
sulindac could be ‘‘redesigned’’ to meet a design-defect
duty imposed by state law. But the dictates of federal
law are static (absent congressional or regulatory
amendment).88 The majority explained that because
‘‘the FDCA requires a generic drug to have the same active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form,
82

Id. at 2491.
Id.
84
Id. at 2483, 2493.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 2470 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
87
Id.; see also id. at 2575 (quoting Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37).
88
See infra Part III.C (discussing potential regulatory and
statutory amendments that would override the results in Mutual and PLIVA).
83
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strength, and labeling as the brand-name drug on which
it is based,’’89 the First Circuit was ‘‘correct . . . that
‘Mutual cannot legally make sulindac in another composition.’ ’’90 ‘‘Indeed,’’ the Court went on, ‘‘were Mutual to change the composition of its sulindac, the altered chemical would be a new drug that would require
its own NDA to be marketed.’’91
Given this reasoning, a ‘‘pure’’ design-defect claim—
that is, one not based on labeling inadequacies—is
likely to meet the same preemption fate as one based in
whole or in part on labeling inadequacies. After Mutual,
generic drug manufacturers will argue with considerable force that if the federal duty not to change the label of a generic prescription drug triggers impossibility
preemption of a state-law failure-to-warn claim, as the
Court held in PLIVA, so, too, the federal duty not to
change a generic drug’s design would trigger impossibility preemption of a state-law claim based solely on
the product’s defective design.92 Taken together with
PLIVA, then, Mutual means that consumers harmed by
generic drugs that are defectively designed or mislabeled generally will be unable to hold manufacturers liable under state law.
These holdings are significant because, as noted earlier, about 75 percent of all drug prescriptions are for
generic drugs,93 and every state has a substitution law
that permits or requires pharmacists who receive a prescription for a brand-name drug to fill it with that drug’s
generic equivalent.94 Generic substitution often occurs
without the consumer’s consent or knowledge, as occurred in both Mutual and PLIVA. Even in states where
pharmacists are only permitted (but not required) to
substitute generic for brand-name drugs, consumers
tend to opt for generics because insurance companies
often charge higher co-pays for a brand-name drug
when a generic is available.95 And, as noted, about 90
percent of prescriptions for drugs available in both
brand-name and generic forms are filled with generics.96 In an amicus brief in PLIVA, a group of drug regulation and health care experts conducted a market
analysis showing that ‘‘out of 4,653 approved drugs
with distinct ingredients, delivery routes, and strengths,
more than half—2,438—are available in generic form.
Of those, 1,062 are available only in generic form[.]’’97
89
Id. at 2475 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(v) &
(8)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(c)).
90
Id. (quoting Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37).
91
Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h)).
92
See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., ___ F. Supp. 2d
___, 2013 WL 4306434, *6 (Aug. 15, 2013) (holding ‘‘pure’’
design-defect claim preempted under Mutual).
93
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94
See id.
95
Brief of Mark T. Law, et al., at 20 (emphasis in original),
in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No. 09-993 (filed Mar. 2, 2011)
(hereafter ‘‘Experts Brief’’), available at 2011 WL 794111, *20
(citing Geoffrey F. Joyce et al., Employer Drug Benefit Plans
and Spending on Prescription Drugs, 288 J. Am. Med. Ass’n
1733, 1733-34 (2002); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., The Effect of
Incentive-based Formularies on Prescription-Drug Utilization
and Spending, 349 New Eng. J. Med. 2224, 2225 (2003)); see
also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
96
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2584.
97
Experts Brief, at 18, available at 2011 WL 794111, *18;
see also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing same and similar data showing that ‘‘from one-third to
one-half of generic drugs no longer have a marketed brandname equivalent’’).
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In sum, the upshot of Mutual and PLIVA is that most
people harmed by prescription generic drugs have lost
their access to the courts.

B. Exceptions to PLIVA-Mutual No-Liability Rule?
Taken together, do PLIVA and Mutual eliminate any
possibility that patients injured by generic drugs may
recover compensation under state law? Absent congressional or regulatory action to overrule the effect of
these holdings, three potential exceptions come to
mind, two suggested by the Mutual majority and one
based on imposing liability on brand-name manufacturers for injuries caused by generic drugs. None is likely
to provide a complete replacement for the generally applicable state-law remedies that existed before the Supreme Court’s PLIVA and Mutual rulings, although two
offer promise for injured patients seeking damages under state law. We discuss each in turn.

1. Absolute Liability
The Mutual majority left open the question whether
federal law would preempt a state-law claim that a generic drug manufacturer is absolutely liable for injuries
caused by its products.98 As mentioned earlier, Justice
Alito distinguished what he called a ‘‘true absoluteliability state-law system’’ from one based on ‘‘strict liability.’’99 In the former scheme, ‘‘liability does not reflect the breach of any duties at all, but merely serves to
spread risk.’’100 In a ‘‘true’’ absolute-liability system,
then, causation is the liability trigger, and once the
plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s product caused
the plaintiff’s injury, the defendant is liable regardless
of whether the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff or, more generally, to the class of consumers for
whom the product was intended.
By contrast, Justice Alito explained, although strict liability ‘‘does not depend on negligence, [it] still signals
breach of a duty.’’101 And, New Hampshire law—the
law applicable in Mutual—he went on, ‘‘has consistently held that the manufacturer of a product has a
‘duty to design his product reasonably safely for the
uses which he can foresee.’ ’’102
Why all the fuss over whether New Hampshire
design-defect law does or does not impose a duty? Assume, as the majority held, that New Hampshire law
imposes a duty to act to design products ‘‘reasonably
safely,’’ and a jury finds that that duty was breached because the product was marketed in its current, unreasonably dangerous design or should have been marketed with another ‘‘reasonably safe’’ design. At the
same time, the argument goes, federal law both authorizes the product’s sale, as it did with sulindac, and prohibits the seller from unilaterally changing the product’s design (to meet the dictates of state law or for any
other reason). As the majority viewed the law, the con98

Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1.
Id. at 2473-74.
100
Id. at 2473.
101
Id.
102
Id. (quoting Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d
843, 847 (N.H. 1978)); see also id. at 2474 (quoting other New
Hampshire Supreme Court decisions for the same and similar
propositions).
99
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fluence of these facts made meeting both the federal
and state duties impossible.103
But if state law imposes no duty—that is, if a state requires a seller to compensate anyone injured by its
product regardless of whether the product violated a
standard for its design—it is difficult to see a conflict
with federal law, whether typed ‘‘impossibility’’ or otherwise. In that scenario, the state has decided that its
residents should be insured against injuries caused by
all products—whether federally approved or not—and,
presumably for reasons of efficiency, the state has designated the seller as the insurer (with the ‘‘premiums,’’
at least in part, effectively included in the products’ retail prices).
Strict liability is sometimes equated with (or confused with) absolute liability, even in prestigious quarters.104 But Justice Alito eliminated any potential confusion, first, when he characterized New Hampshire
strict-liability design-defect law as imposing a duty on
the seller, and, second, when he said, more generally,
that ‘‘most common-law causes of action for negligence
and strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but
rather to impose affirmative duties.’’105
Justice Alito may have understated the latter point.
Although exceptions may exist for certain types of
products or activities, no jurisdiction of which we are
aware generally imposes absolute liability on the sellers
of products, but rather authorizes suit under theories of
negligence and/or strict liability. Common-law negligence is premised on a duty to use reasonable care.106
As for strict liability, a minority of jurisdictions do not
recognize design-defect claims against the manufacturers of prescription drugs at all.107 Many jurisdictions
adopted the Second Restatement of Torts, which endorsed strict products liability, including for design defects, even where the seller had used ‘‘all possible care’’
in preparing and selling its product.108 But the plaintiff
was required to show that the seller sold a ‘‘product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property’’—that is, the seller
had a duty to design a non-defective product and could
escape liability if it did so.109
Though courts and commentators struggled to define
that duty, they were ‘‘search[ing] mightily for standards
103
The dissenting justices did not view compliance with
federal law impossible because, in response to a state-law duty
to design the product other than as federally approved, the
manufacturer could, among other things, remove the product
from the market (which, of course, is not prohibited by federal
law). Id. at 2480-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
104
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) (Index)
(‘‘ABSOLUTE LIABILITY See Strict Liability’’).
105
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (citations omitted). The
dissenters did not disagree with the majority either with this
general statement, or that New Hampshire law imposed a
design-related duty on Mutual; instead, they disagreed on the
characteristics of that duty and whether it conflicted with duties imposed by federal law. See id. at 2480-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2487-88 (Sotomayor, dissenting).
106
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282, at 9
(1965); Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts § 28, at 160-61
(5th ed. 1984).
107
See Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a), at 348
(1965).
109
Id. § 402A(1), at 347; see Mutual, 122 S. Ct. at 2473.
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or ‘tests’ of liability that would stop liability well short
of absolute.’’110 Generally, they favored the imposition
of liability only where a product’s risks outweighed its
benefits.111 The Third Restatement of Torts followed
this trend. Its section devoted exclusively to liability for
the sale of defective prescription drugs and medical devices expressly adopted a risk-benefit-based duty for
design-defect claims.112
In sum, although absolute liability provides a theoretical basis for escaping the preemption holdings of
Mutual and PLIVA, it currently provides no real-world
basis for doing so.

2. Liability Based on Misbranding
a. After concluding that Ms. Bartlett’s ‘‘warningbased design-defect cause of action’’ was preempted,113
the Mutual majority noted that it was not ‘‘address[ing]
state design-defect claims that parallel the federal misbranding statute.’’114 This reference to ‘‘parallel’’
claims picks up on a recent strain in the Court’s tort
preemption jurisprudence that has offered some hope
to plaintiffs seeking compensation in otherwise preempted fields. Beginning with Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr,115 and then in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,116
and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,117 the Court held that express provisions of federal law that preempt state requirements that are ‘‘different from’’ or ‘‘in addition to’’
federal requirements do not preempt state requirements that ‘‘parallel’’ federal requirements.118 A statelaw duty premised on violations of a federal duty, the
Court has explained, is not ‘‘different’’ or ‘‘in addition
to’’ the federal duty, even when the state-law duty is invoked to provide a state-law damages remedy that goes
beyond what federal law provides.119
110
David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 291, 299
(2008) (emphasis added); see also id. (‘‘In considering the concept of design defectiveness, it is crucial to remember that a
manufacturer’s liability for harm from a product’s design characteristics, even if labeled ‘strict,’ is not absolute.’’).
111
Id. at 299-321.
112
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6(c),
at 145 (1998) (requiring inquiry into whether ‘‘the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits.
. . .’’).
113
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2477.
114
Id. at 2477 n.4.
115
518 U.S. 470 (1996) (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 360k)
(‘‘different from, or in addition to’’).
116
544 U.S. 431 (2005) (interpreting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b))
(‘‘in addition to or different from’’).
117
552 U.S. 312 (2008) (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 360k).
118
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495 (‘‘Nothing in [21 U.S.C.] § 360k denies Florida the right to provide a traditional damages remedy
for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel
federal requirements.’’); accord id. at 513 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330;
Bates, 544 U.S. at 447.
119
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495 (‘‘The presence of a [state-law]
damages remedy does not amount to the additional or different ‘requirement’ that is necessary [to trigger preemption] under the [federal] statute; rather, it merely provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical existing ‘requirements’ under federal law.’’); id. at 513 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (‘‘Where a state
cause of action seeks to enforce an FDCA requirement, that
claim does not impose a requirement that is ‘different from, or
in addition to,’ requirements under federal law.’’).
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b. The FDCA’s misbranding provision provides that
a drug or device is misbranded if, among other things,
‘‘it is dangerous to health when used in the dosage or
manner, or with the frequency or duration prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.’’120
The Mutual majority noted that ‘‘even an FDAapproved drug’’ must be ‘‘pull[ed] . . . from the market’’
if it violates this misbranding provision,121 and then
added, with apparent approval, a ‘‘cf.’’ citation to the
Court’s decision in Bates, which held that a ‘‘state-law
pesticide labeling requirement [was] not preempted under [an] express pre-emption provision, provided it was
‘equivalent to, and fully consistent with, [federal] misbranding provisions.’ ’’122
In our view, the Court’s discussion of misbranding
could become the source of a meaningful exception to
the general preemption rule established in Mutual. It
bears noting that because misbranding under the FDCA
is based on deficiencies in drug labeling,123 a state-law
claim based on misbranding must be pleaded, to use
Justice Alito’s words, as ‘‘a warning-based designdefect cause of action,’’124 and not as what we have
called here a ‘‘pure’’ design-defect claim based solely
on a duty to change the drug’s chemical composition or
not to market the product as currently formulated.
A state-law misbranding claim likely will not, however, provide a basis for an exception to PLIVA, which
held that state-law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers are preempted because federal law bars generic drug sellers from unilaterally
amending their labels to comply with state-law duties (a
federal prohibition that persists even when the product
is misbranded). Indeed, in PLIVA, the Court rejected
FDA’s argument that a generic manufacturer’s duty under the misbranding statute to propose ‘‘stronger warning labels to the agency,’’ which in turn might result in
‘‘a new label for both the brand-name and generic
drug,’’ was sufficient to defeat the manufacturer’s claim
of impossibility preemption.125 A misbranding-based
claim thus must remain a design-defect claim, and it escapes preemption because when federal law demands
that a manufacturer remove an approved product from
the market, a state-law duty that also may be heeded by
leaving the market cannot give rise to impossibility preemption.
c. We expect generic drug manufacturers to argue
that if a state-law misbranding-based claim may survive
preemption under Mutual at all, FDA itself must have
found the drug in question misbranded. We think that
this argument will fail for several reasons.
First, that argument would be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s understanding of a ‘‘parallel’’ requirement, which provides an exception from preemption for
‘‘a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule.’’126
As Mutual explained, it is the presence of conflicting
state and federal duties, not that regulated actors might
avoid a conflict by taking or refraining from certain
conduct (such as the possibility that a manufacturer
120

21 U.S.C. § 352(j).
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 n.4.
122
Id. (quoting Bates, 544 U.S. at 447).
123
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 352.
124
Id. at 2477.
125
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2576 (citing 21 U.S.C. 352(f)(2)).
126
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
121
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might remove its product from the market), that gives
rise to preemption.127 That same principle should apply
when federal and state duties coincide. When that happens, ‘‘the threat of a damages remedy will give manufacturers an additional cause to comply, but the requirements imposed on them under state and federal law do
not differ.’’128
Second, in Bates, the Court held that a state-law
misbranding-based claim escaped preemption, under
an express preemption provision that overrides ‘‘different’’ or ‘‘additional’’ state requirements, so long as that
claim was ‘‘equivalent to, and fully consistent with, [the
relevant federal] misbranding provisions.’’129 In Bates,
no federal finding of misbranding of the pesticide in
question had been made, and the Court nonetheless
was clear that it would allow a state-law misbrandingbased claim to proceed regardless of whether the federal regulator had weighed in.
Indeed, the Court in Bates rejected the defendant’s
argument that allowing state law to operate would
‘‘ ‘give juries in 50 States the authority to give content
to [the federal statute’s] misbranding prohibition, establishing a crazy-quilt of anti-misbranding requirements different from the one defined by [the federal
statute] itself.’ ’’130 Mutual’s citation to Bates suggests
that the same ‘‘equivalent to, and fully consistent with’’
standard should apply to a state-law misbranding-based
claim against a generic drug manufacturer,131 but not
that the federal government first must make its own
misbranding finding.
Finally, in Mutual, Justice Alito knew well that FDA
had not found sulindac misbranded, yet he held the
‘‘misbranding provision . . . not applicable here’’ not on
that basis, but because ‘‘the jury was not asked to find
whether new evidence concerning sulindac that had not
been made available to the FDA rendered sulindac so
dangerous as to be misbranded under the federal misbranding statute.’’132 This statement suggests that a
properly instructed jury may consider a misbrandingbased state-law claim absent an FDA misbranding finding without offending the Supremacy Clause.133

d. As we see it, a misbranding-based exception to
preemption would provide injured plaintiffs access to
the courts in some circumstances, but would not swallow the PLIVA-Mutual rule. As Mutual explained, FDA
maintains that ‘‘a drug is misbranded under federal law
only when liability is based on new and scientifically
significant information that was not before the
FDA.’’134 If FDA does, in fact, interpret and enforce the
misbranding statute in this way, it is likely that the
courts will defer to FDA’s interpretation and require
plaintiffs to show that their state-law misbranding
127

Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2477-78.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 513 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
129
Bates, 544 U.S. at 447.
130
Id. at 448 (quoting defendant’s brief).
131
See Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 n.4.
132
Id.
133
See also Bates, 544 U.S. at 454 (‘‘If a case proceeds to
trial, the court’s jury instructions must ensure that nominally
equivalent labeling requirements are genuinely equivalent. If a
defendant so requests, a court should instruct the jury on the
relevant [federal] misbranding standards, as well as any regulations that add content to those standards.’’).
134
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 n.4.
128
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claims are based only on this type of ‘‘new and scientifically significant information.’’135
Courts will view this limit as reasonable because preemption is often premised on an aversion to secondguessing agency expertise, and a ‘‘new-information’’
requirement—which operates only when the agency
has not exercised its judgment—is consistent with that
premise. FDA’s Supreme Court brief in Mutual made
this point. The agency repeatedly derided ‘‘[t]ort judgments that second-guess FDA’s expert [risk-benefit]
determination[s].’’136 It urged a preemption finding in
part because it had previously considered the scientific
evidence that had been put before the jury in Ms. Bartlett’s case and had ‘‘conducted a ‘comprehensive review’ of the risks and benefits of all NSAIDs but did not
conclude that sulindac or other NSAIDs . . . should be
withdrawn from the market based on incidents of SJS/
TEN.’’137
At the same time, however, FDA acknowledged that
there should have been no preemption if ‘‘notwithstanding FDA’s approval of sulindac and its review of
its safety in 2005, new evidence concerning the rare occurrence of SJS/TEN rendered sulindac so dangerous
as to be misbranded under that federal standard.’’138
Thus, in cases where the relevant evidence had not
been before FDA at the time of the product’s approval
or was not otherwise the subject of formal FDA review
before the plaintiff was prescribed the drug, in our
view, that evidence may form the basis of a state-law
misbranding-based claim unaffected by preemption.

e. Assuming that lower courts hold that state-law
misbranding-based claims escape preemption if they
meet a ‘‘new evidence’’ standard, how often will plaintiffs be able to meet that standard? The Court in PLIVA
doubted the impact of its preemption holding, noting
that ‘‘FDA informs us that ‘[a]s a practical matter, genuinely new information about drugs in long use (as generic drugs typically are) appears infrequently.’ ’’139 It
called situations like those that befell the PLIVA
plaintiffs—who did allege injuries based on the seller’s
failure to convey information that arose after the product’s approval—‘‘apparently so rare that the FDA has
no ‘formal regulation’ establishing generic drug manufacturers’ duty to initiate a label change. . . .’’140
135
Cf. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-76 (deferring to FDA’s interpretation of generic drug labeling statutes and regulations
because that interpretation was not ‘‘plainly erroneous’’).
FDA’s interpretation may also garner deference from courts as
consistent with the agency’s view that brand-name manufacturers may unilaterally change their labels without prior
agency approval ‘‘to reflect newly acquired information.’’ 21
C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (emphasis added).
136
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, at 29, in Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, No. 12142 (U.S. filed Jan. 22, 2013), available at 2013 WL 314460,
*29; see also id. at 13, 28, 34, available at 2013 WL 314460, *13,
*28, *34.
137
Id. at 30, available at 2013 WL 314460, *30.
138
Id. at 24, available at 2013 WL 314460, *24.
139
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 n.9 (quoting Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at
34-35, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No. 09-993 (U.S. filed Mar. 2,
2011), available at 2011 WL 741927, *34-*35).
140
Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 21, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
No. 09-993 (U.S. filed Mar. 2, 2011), available at 2011 WL
741927, *21).
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Though generic products generally do enter the market well after their brand-name equivalents, we think
PLIVA’s reasoning here is questionable (or of questionable relevance) for two reasons. First, that ‘‘genuine[]
new-information’’ cases arise only rarely may mean
only that suits involving generic-drug injuries are rare,
not that suits alleging injuries from generic drugs, if unobstructed by preemption, rarely would involve new information. Indeed, given that generic-drug injury suits
necessarily arise well after the product was first marketed, we expect that many (if not all) of them allege
that the plaintiff’s injury could have been avoided if she
or her doctors had been made aware of information not
available to FDA at the time the product was approved.
Second, PLIVA’s surmise that there is little relevant
‘‘new’’ safety information about generic drugs may be
incorrect. FDA’s failure to have a ‘‘formal regulation’’
establishing a duty to initiate label changes probably reflects the agency’s failure to keep up with the increasing marketplace dominance of generic drugs rather
than proof that there is no need for generic manufacturers to initiate safety-related label changes. As explained
below in Part III.C.1., the agency recently announced
plans to propose a regulation that would authorize generic drug manufacturers to update labels based on
new safety information, which would make no sense if
FDA thought it unnecessary.
Moreover, evidence suggests that new information
implicating a drug’s safety does arise years after FDA
approval. ‘‘Many serious [adverse drug reactions] are
discovered only after a drug has been on the market for
years. Only half of newly discovered serious adverse
drug reactions are detected and documented in the Physicians’ Desk Reference [the doctors’ drug labeling
bible] within 7 years after drug approval.’’141
For these reasons, we believe that state-law
misbranding-based claims remain legally viable after
Mutual and should provide access to the courts for
people injured by generic drugs in a meaningful number of cases.

3. Suits Against Brand-Name Manufacturers
Since at least the early 1990s, some plaintiffs alleging
injuries from prescription generic drugs have sought
damages from the manufacturers of the brand-name
products on which the generic products were based. As
discussed below, the brand-name manufacturers maintain that these suits fail as a matter of state law, while
plaintiffs claim that they are authorized by traditional
common-law tort principles. For convenience, we refer
to these cases as ‘‘brand-name suits.’’
These suits may take on added significance in light of
the Supreme Court’s preemption holdings in PLIVA and
Mutual, which largely (if not entirely) eliminated generic manufacturers’ state-law liability for injuries
caused by their products, and Wyeth v. Levine, where
the Court held that state-law inadequate-warning suits
against brand-name manufacturers generally are not
preempted by the FDCA, in significant part because
brand-name manufacturers can make safety enhancing
changes to their labels without prior FDA approval.142
That is, though brand-name suits raise a controversial
141
See Karen E. Lasser, et al., Timing of New Black Box
Warnings and Withdrawals for Prescription Medications, 287
J.A.M.A. 2215, 2218 (May 1, 2002).
142
555 U.S. at 570-71.
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question of state law, they do not raise federal preemption issues in light of Wyeth. We now consider whether
brand-name suits are a viable future option for plaintiffs
seeking compensation no longer available to them from
generic prescription drug manufacturers.
Factually, brand-name suits are premised on a brandname manufacturer’s alleged labeling misstatements
about its product’s hazards or contraindications. These
alleged misstatements, the plaintiff’s complaint will allege, had their origins in the brand-name manufacturer’s label. This brand-name label appeared on the generic manufacturer’s label because the law required it.
Moreover, an ‘‘exact copy’’ of the brand-namegenerated label appeared in the Physicians’ Desk Reference, which doctors use to learn about a product’s
safety and efficacy before making their prescribing decisions.143 So, when doctors rely on labeling to prescribe a prescription drug (whether brand-name or generic), they are relying on the brand-name manufacturer’s labeling. Thus, the plaintiff will maintain that the
brand-name manufacturer’s labeling misstatements
foreseeably caused her injuries, even though she ingested only the generic equivalent, because the brandname manufacturer knows that whenever one of its
products is mislabeled, the generic product will be as
well.
Legally, brand-name suits are not based on strict
products liability, which imposes liability on the sellers
of products.144 Instead, they are premised on claims of
negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation, which
plaintiffs maintain authorizes liability against a nonseller who has reason to know that a third party could
suffer harm.145 Brand-name-suit plaintiffs claim support for these theories in Sections 310 and 311 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 311—entitled
‘‘Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm’’—provides that ‘‘one who negligently gives
false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in
reasonable reliance upon such information, where such
harm results . . . to such third persons as the actor
should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.’’146
The ‘‘one’’ who gives false information is the brandname manufacturer who, the plaintiff claims, negligently (or intentionally) made false statements in its labeling. The ‘‘other’’ generally would be the prescribing
doctor who relied on the false labeling. And the ‘‘third
person’’ is the patient who relied on the doctor’s misinformed prescription (and, in turn, was injured by the
drug).
Is the doctor’s reliance reasonable in these
circumstances? And should the brand-name manufacturer have expected that patients would be put in peril?
143
See Gilbert v. Sec’y HHS, 2005 WL 3320085, *8 n.22
(Fed. Cl. 2005); see also, e.g., Garvey v. O’Donoghue, 530 A.2d
1141, 1144 n.4 (D.C. 1997).
144
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, at 347
(1965).
145
See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 309-10
(Cal. App. 2008) (explaining differences in strict products liability and misrepresentation theories in case brought by generic drug user who sued brand-name manufacturer on misrepresentation theory).
146
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311(b), at 106 (1965)
(emphasis added). Section 310 imposes similar liability for
knowing misrepresentations. See id. § 310, at 103.
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Here is what the California Court of Appeal said on
those topics in Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.:
In California, as in most states, pharmacists have long been
authorized by statute to fill prescriptions for name-brand
drugs with their generic equivalents unless the prescribing
physician expressly forbids such a substitution. . . . . It is
therefore highly likely that a prescription for [the brandname drug] written in reliance on [the brand-name’s] product information will be filled with [the] generic. . . . And, because by law the generic and name-brand versions of drugs
are biologically equivalent . . . , it is also eminently foreseeable that a physician might prescribe [the] generic . . . in reliance on [the brand-name’s] representations about the
[brand-name drug]. In this context, we have no difficulty
concluding that [the brand-name manufacturer] should reasonably perceive that there could be injurious reliance on
its product information by a patient taking [the] generic
[drug].147

Although we find this logic persuasive, Conte remains an outlier. Most courts presented with the question have held that brand-name suits are not viable under state law. The lead case is the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Foster v. American Home Products Corp.,148
which rejected what it viewed as an impermissible endrun around the standard products-liability action
against the seller.149 A negligent misrepresentation suit
against a brand-name manufacturer, the court added,
‘‘stretch[ed] the concept of foreseeability too far.’’150
Though Foster involved only an interpretation of Maryland common law, many other courts, applying the law
of a variety of states, have followed its lead.151
Despite the lopsided split in the case law, patients injured by generic drugs as a result of labeling inadequacies should give serious thought to brand-name suits for
three reasons.
147
85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 313 (Cal. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted); accord Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694,
705-09 (D. Vt. 2010).
148
29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994).
149
Id. at 168 (‘‘Although actions for negligent misrepresentation arise in many contexts other than products liability, in
this case the allegations of negligent misrepresentation are an
effort to recover for injuries caused by a product without meeting the requirements the law imposes in products liability actions. Maryland law requires a plaintiff seeking to recover for
an injury by a product to demonstrate that the defendant
manufactured the product at issue.’’).
150
Id. at 171.
151
See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL
4529359, *7-*11 (Aug. 28, 2013); Smith v. Wyeth, 657 F.3d 420
(6th Cir. 2011); Finnicum v. Wyeth, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 616,
619–21 (E.D. Tex. 2010); Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543 F. Supp.
2d 1351, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432
F. Supp. 2d 514, 540–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006); rev’d on other
grounds, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008); Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc.,
991 So. 2d 31, 34-35 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Sharp v. Leichus, 952
So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Flynn v. American Home
Products Corp., 627 N.W. 2d 342, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
But see Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, ___ So. 3d ___, 2013 WL 135753,
*21-*26 & n.8, *30 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) (Murdock, J., dissenting) (reviewing dozen of decisions rejecting brand-name
suits). In Weeks, the Alabama Supreme Court held 8-1 that
Alabama law authorized suit by a generic drug user against a
brand-name manufacturer on fraud and misrepresentation
theories. The court issued its decision without hearing oral argument and now is reconsidering its ruling. It heard oral argument on September 4, 2013, and a decision is pending. See
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2013/06/alabama-supremecourt-grants-rehearing-on-whether-brand-name-drug-co-canbe-held-liable-for-inadequa.html.
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First, most (though not all) of the rulings that have rejected brand-name suits pre-date the Supreme Court’s
decision in PLIVA. Before PLIVA, plaintiffs regularly
maintained that FDA’s so-called ‘‘changes-beingeffected’’ (CBE) regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, authorized generic manufacturers, like their brand-name parents, to make safety-related label changes without first
obtaining FDA’s approval. Under that view, a generic
manufacturer’s right to amend its label, on its own,
weakens a claim that the name-brand manufacturer is
responsible for the generic manufacturer’s label deficiencies, which is critical to the misrepresentation
theory underlying a brand-name suit.
Indeed, in Foster, the Fourth Circuit held a brandname suit non-viable in significant part because
‘‘[m]anufacturers of generic drugs, like all other manufacturers, are responsible for the representations they
make regarding their products.’’152 The court explained
that although generic manufacturers do ‘‘not initially
formulate the warnings and representations,’’ they are
‘‘permitted to add or strengthen warnings and delete
misleading statements on labels, even without prior
FDA approval.’’153
PLIVA rejected that position, deferring to FDA’s view
that the CBE regulation authorizes only brand-name
manufacturers, and not generic manufacturers, ‘‘to unilaterally strengthen their labels,’’154 effectively holding
that generic manufacturers are in the labeling straightjacket that Foster maintained did not exist. PLIVA’s
bedrock premise, in other words, is the same one that
forms the basis for a brand-name suit: that a brandname manufacturer bears sole responsibility for a generic manufacturer’s label.155
Second, although the case law generally holds that
brand-name suits are not authorized by state law, almost all of the case law involves federal district court
predictions of state law. Very few are state-court decisions, and none is from a state court of last resort, the
only court that possesses final authority on whether
state-law brand-name suits are viable.
On the other hand, an intermediate appellate court
(Conte) has backed brand-name suits under California
law, and, as noted earlier, the Alabama Supreme Court
is poised to decide the issue in Wyeth v. Weeks.156
Weeks arrived at the Alabama Supreme Court from the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama,
which had certified the state-law issue to it.157 Other
federal courts should follow the Alabama district
court’s lead. Because most suits against drug manufacturers are filed in, or removed to, federal court on
diversity-of-citizenship grounds,158 certification will al152

Foster, 29 F.3d at 179.
Id. at 169-70 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70).
154
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575.
155
See Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739, 747-48 (8th
Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring) (explaining in dicta that
PLIVA and Mutual ‘‘severely eroded the foundation of th[e]
analysis’’ of the courts that have rejected brand-name suits because that analysis has ‘‘generally been predicated on the assumption that the generic manufacturers could independently
safeguard and strengthen their own labels.’’).
156
See supra note 151.
157
Wyeth v. Weeks, ___ So. 3d at ___, 2013 WL 135753, *1
(setting out certified question).
158
See id. at __; 2013 WL 135753, *26 & n.8.
153

U.S. LAW WEEK

ISSN 0148-8139

low the state courts to weigh in on a question that is
rightfully theirs.159
Third, absent congressional or FDA action,160 brandname suits may be the only option for patients seeking
compensation for injuries suffered from their use of
mislabeled generic prescription drugs. PLIVA and Mutual may provide complete (or at least substantial) immunity to generic manufacturers, but their reasoning—
that generic drug labels are the province of brand-name
manufacturers—is consistent with a state-law duty that
makes brand-name manufacturers responsible.

C. Potential Regulatory and/or Congressional Action
Whatever one thinks of the Supreme Court’s legal
analyses in Wyeth, PLIVA, and Mutual, the results of
those decisions, taken together, make nonsensical public policy. A state-law failure-to-warn suit—the traditional claim against drug makers—may be brought
against a brand-name manufacturer for alleged product
mislabeling, but a suit against the generic manufacturer
of the same drug for the same alleged mislabeling is
barred by federal law. Nor does the same claim against
the generic manufacturer escape preemption if it is
pleaded as a design-defect claim (with limited potential
exceptions discussed above in Parts II.A & B).
Justice Sotomayor noted the ‘‘absurd’’ consequences
of the Supreme Court’s rulings in her PLIVA dissent. An
injured consumer’s ability to recover for her injuries
from a culpable drug manufacturer depends, she said,
on ‘‘the happenstance’’ of whether the consumer’s
pharmacist dispensed the brand-name or generic version of the drug.161
Justice Thomas, speaking for the majority in PLIVA,
also acknowledged the irrationality of the current regime. He noted that had the plaintiffs there taken the
‘‘brand-name drug prescribed by their doctors,’’ instead
of the generic drug substituted by their pharmacists,
‘‘Wyeth would control and their lawsuits would not be
pre-empted.’’162 From the plaintiffs’ perspective, he acknowledged, ‘‘finding preemption [in PLIVA] but not in
Wyeth makes little sense.’’163
We now turn to whether FDA and/or Congress can
make sense of the scheme left in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.

1. Potential FDA Regulatory Action
Because the rulings in Mutual and PLIVA turned on
the asserted impossibility of a manufacturer’s simultaneous compliance with both federal labeling rules for
generic drugs and a state-law duty to make safety-based
revisions to a generic drug label, FDA could amend its
labeling rules to eliminate the impossibility identified
by the Supreme Court majority.
159
See id. at ___, 2013 WL 135753, *2 (‘‘Certification is appropriate here to resolve the disagreement among the federal
district courts within Alabama and to prevent both federal
courts within the State and state courts around the country
from having to ‘mak[e] unnecessary Erie guesses’ about unsettled questions of Alabama law.’’) (quoting Tobin v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir.2005)); see
also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
79-80 (1997) (discussing benefits of federal-court certification
of state-law questions to state high courts).
160
See infra Part III.C.
161
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
162
Id. at 2581 (majority opinion).
163
Id.
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In Wyeth, the Court had rejected preemption-byimpossibility because, among other reasons, FDA’s
CBE regulation authorized brand-name drug manufacturers unilaterally to amend their labels to add warnings, rendering a state-law claim premised on a duty to
have issued these warnings consistent with, and not in
conflict with, federal law.164
As noted earlier, PLIVA came to the opposite conclusion because, the Court held, FDA regulations did not
authorize unilateral changes to generic drug labels.165
Presumably, then, if FDA were to amend its rules to authorize generic drug manufacturers to use the CBE
regulation in the circumstances under which brandname manufacturers currently have that authority, the
federal regulatory basis for PLIVA’s impossibility holding would no longer exist. This amendment would
eliminate the absurd consequences of having inconsistent state-law tort duties for brand-name and generic
drug manufacturers highlighted in Justice Sotomayor’s
PLIVA dissent.
The tort system operates to provide compensation
and to induce safer behavior in the future, but only after someone has suffered an injury. It bears emphasis,
therefore, that authorizing generic manufacturers to
make labeling changes would be aimed principally at
enhancing drug safety and preventing injuries that
might otherwise occur.166
In considering whether to provide generic manufacturers access to the CBE process, FDA’s principal consideration should be to rationalize and modernize its
generic drug labeling rules. FDA promulgated its CBE
regulation because it wanted to provide a mechanism
for companies to amend their labels when new safety
information ‘‘require[d] prompt corrective action,’’167
without forcing the products off the market while the
agency was considering the labeling changes. The idea,
then, was to protect patients both by putting the most
up-to-date information into their (and their doctors’)
hands and by ensuring their continued access to needed
medications. There is no reason why this same mechanism should not be available to generic manufacturers
and—given the growing market dominance of generic
drugs—every reason why it should.
Like their brand-name counterparts, generic manufacturers will be capable of using the CBE process when
appropriate. Both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers must comply with regulations designed to ensure the post-approval safety of their drugs, and must
‘‘promptly review all adverse drug experience information obtained or otherwise received by the applicant
from any source, foreign or domestic, including information derived from commercial marketing experience,
postmarketing clinical investigations, postmarketing
epidemiological/surveillance studies, reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished scientific papers.’’168
Any report of a ‘‘serious and unexpected’’ drug experience must be reported to FDA within 15 days and
must be promptly investigated by the manufacturer.169
164
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568-69; accord id. at 591-92 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment).
165
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-76.
166
See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 578-79.
167
47 Fed. Reg. 46,622, 46,635 (Oct. 19, 1982).
168
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b) (made applicable to ANDA holders
by 21 C.F.R. § 98(a)).
169
Id. § 314.80(c)(1)(i-ii).
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Most other adverse event reports must be submitted
quarterly for three years after the application is approved and annually after that.170 These periodic reports must include ‘‘a history of actions taken since the
last report because of adverse drug experiences (for example, labeling changes or studies initiated).’’171 Thus,
generic manufacturers, like brand-name manufacturers, participate actively in post-market surveillance of
their products and are in a good position to know about
adverse events and the need, if any, for labeling
changes that would enhance patient safety.
After a brand-name manufacturer employs the CBE
process, FDA must determine whether the label
changes are appropriate. If FDA approves the label
changes as submitted or in modified form, it then requires that the new label be adopted across the board
by all sellers of the drug. FDA can make the same determinations when a generic manufacturer employs the
CBE process.
FDA appears to be moving toward establishing uniformity between brand-name and generic manufacturers. Soon after the Supreme Court’s ruling in PLIVA,
the non-profit consumer organization Public Citizen petitioned FDA to revise its generic drug labeling regulations to authorize generic manufacturer to update their
labels, without prior FDA approval, as currently authorized for brand-name manufacturers in the CBE process.172
For nearly a year and a half, FDA did not comment
publicly on Public Citizen’s petition. Then, in its Supreme Court brief in Mutual, FDA acknowledged that it
‘‘is considering a regulatory change that would allow
generic manufacturers, like brand-name manufacturers, to change their labeling in appropriate
circumstances[,]’’ adding that ‘‘[i]f such a regulatory
change is adopted, it could eliminate preemption of
failure-to-warn claims against generic-drug manufacturers.’’173
Thereafter, in July 2013, the federal Office of Management and Budget announced that FDA planned to
issue ‘‘proposed revisions to FDA’s regulations [that]
would create parity between NDA holders and ANDA
holders with respect to submission of CBE labeling
supplements.’’174 The proposed rule, which was slated
for publication in September 2013 (but has yet to appear), would ‘‘revise and clarify procedures for changes
to the labeling of an approved drug to reflect certain
types of newly acquired information in advance of
FDA’s review of such change.’’175
Justice Alito ended his decision in Mutual by claiming that although Ms. Bartlett’s ‘‘tragic circumstances’’
‘‘evoke[d] deep sympathy,’’ his preemption ruling was
demanded by ‘‘a straightforward application of pre170

Id. § 314.80(c)(2)(i).
Id. § 314.80(c)(2)(ii).
See [Public Citizen] Citizen Petition (Aug. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/1965.pdf.
173
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner in Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, at 15 n.2, No. 12142 (U.S. filed Jan. 22, 2013), available at 2013 WL 314460, *15
n.2.
174
See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling
Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, RIN
0910-AG94, available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/servlet/
ForwardServlet?SearchTarget=Agenda&textfield=0910AG94.
175
Id.
171
172
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emption law,’’ triggered by a regulatory scheme that
‘‘leaves generic drug manufacturers incapable of modifying either the drugs’ compositions or their warnings.’’176 An FDA rule authorizing generic drug manufacturers to amend their labeling to make safety-related
enhancements would put those manufacturers in the
same position as brand-name manufacturers and effectively overrule PLIVA.
That rule would not affect Mutual directly because it
would not authorize manufacturers to make unilateral
changes to a drug’s design. But because ‘‘[f]ailure to instruct or warn is the major basis of liability for manufacturers of prescription drugs,’’177 an FDA regulation
that empowered generic drug manufacturers to modify
their warnings would lift the bar to state-law tort compensation erected by PLIVA and render Mutual largely
irrelevant. More importantly, that regulation would
help prevent drug-related injuries by freeing generic
drug manufacturers to put new safety information in
the hands of doctors and patients before injuries occur.

2. Potential Congressional Action
Congress is unlikely to consider legislation to overrule Mutual. As noted above, state-law suits seeking
compensation for injuries caused by prescription drugs
generally allege a failure to warn of the product’s hazards, not defects in the drug’s design. Legislation aimed
at Mutual alone would not free plaintiffs to maintain
state-law inadequate warning claims and thus would
fail to give them parity with patients injured by brandnamed drugs. That is, from the patients’ perspective, a
liability scheme altered to overule Mutual alone would,
to use Justice Thomas’s words, still ‘‘make[] little
sense.’’178
On the other hand, overruling PLIVA would make
sense. Congress could accomplish that in one of two
ways. First, it could amend the FDCA to provide that
neither the Act nor its regulations preempt state-law
damages claims premised on a failure to warn. If Congress were to do this, it would make sense to overrule
Mutual as well by aiming not only at failure-to-warn
claims but by explicitly exempting from preemption
state-law damages suits alleging injuries from prescription drugs. Congress has taken similar action with respect to over-the-counter drugs by preempting some
state regulatory requirements that differ or add to federal regulatory requirements but, at the same time, expressly exempting products-liability actions.179
Second, as FDA now is contemplating, Congress
could provide that generic drug manufacturers, like
brand-name manufacturers, are authorized to use the
CBE process. Indeed, in April 2012, legislation was introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to authorize ‘‘the holder of an approved [ANDA
to] . . . change the labeling of a drug . . . in the same
manner authorized by regulation for the holder of an
approved new drug application.’’180 The bill has not received a committee vote, let alone reached the floor, in
either chamber. That stagnation comes as no surprise.
In 2008, three years before it decided PLIVA, the Su176

Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2480.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6, cmt.
d, at 147 (1998).
178
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 131.
179
21 U.S.C. § 379r(a), (e).
180
S. 2295, § 2 (2012); H.R. 4384, § 2 (2012).
177
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preme Court held that federal law preempts most statelaw damages claims for injuries caused by medical devices that go through full FDA premarket approval.181
Shortly thereafter, legislation was introduced to overrule the decision,182 but it, too, has languished.
In our view, the first route—congressional passage of
an anti-preemption provision—would be more appropriate because it would allow Congress to patrol the
borderline between state and federal law without dictating the details of federal labeling regulation. As noted,
Congress has exempted from preemption state-law
products-liability claims concerning over-the-counter
drugs,183 and it has taken the same or similar approaches in other contexts.184 And FDA, like most regulators, is not charged by Congress with determining the
best means to compensate patients injured by the products it regulates.
Put another way, it is sensible for Congress to step in
when it believes that the preemptive effect of federal
law threatens the states’ traditional role in providing
compensation for consumers harmed by products. At
the same time, Congress can leave the nuances of drug
labeling policy to FDA, the expert agency it charged
with creating and enforcing that policy.
In any event, it is doubtful the votes are there to overrule PLIVA or Mutual. As noted, bills to overrule PLIVA
by authorizing generic drug manufacturers to employ
the CBE process have gone nowhere. In sum, if change
is to come anytime soon, it is going to come from FDA.

D. Effects on Preemption Doctrine
Mutual raises questions about the Supreme Court’s
preemption doctrine regarding the presumption against
preemption and the differences, if any, between federal
preemption of state positive law and federal preemption
of state damages liability.

1. The Precarious Status
of the Presumption Against Preemption
a. For decades, in both express and implied preemption cases, the Supreme Court has applied a presumption against preemption.185 The Court has grounded
this principle in federalism, in the idea that, unless Congress ousts state law with unmistakable clarity, the
states should be free to chart their own course, especially in areas that they have historically regulated:
[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action. In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress
has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
181

Riegel, 552 U.S. 312.
See H.R. 1346 (2009); S. 540 (2009).
183
21 U.S.C. § 379r(a), (e).
184
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v (preemption and antipreemption provisions for federally regulated pesticides); 21
U.S.C. § 360k (preemption provision for medical devices, with
exemption from preemption in some circumstances); 49 U.S.C.
§ 30103 (preemption provision regarding motor vehicle standards, with savings clause for common-law liability).
185
See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2591 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing both express and implied preemption cases that invoke
the presumption against preemption); see also, e.g., Lohr, 518
U.S. at 485.
182
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by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’186

The Court has applied the presumption against preemption with special force where a finding of preemption would ascribe to Congress an intent to eliminate all
damages remedies for consumers injured by unlawful
conduct.187 The presumption arguably hit its highwater mark in the tort preemption area in Bates v.
DowAgrosciences, which imposed on courts ‘‘a duty to
accept the reading that disfavors preemption’’ when a
federal statute plausibly admits of both a preemptive
and non-preemptive reading.188
But the presumption may not be with us for long. The
Mutual majority made no mention of the presumption
at all, not even bothering to respond to Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of the ‘‘majority’s failure to adhere
to the presumption’’ despite its ‘‘call[] on Congress to
provide greater clarity with regard to the ‘difficult preemption questions that arise in the prescription drug
context.’ ’’189 As she put it, ‘‘the whole point of the presumption against pre-emption is that congressional ambiguity should cut in favor of preserving state autonomy.’’190
Mutual followed a recent trend. In Wyeth, Justice
Alito, writing in dissent for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia, had strongly suggested that no
presumption against preemption applies in implied
conflict-preemption cases.191 And, then in PLIVA, the
majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, also ignored the presumption. And, in a plurality section of his
opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia
and Alito, Justice Thomas appears to have rejected the
presumption against preemption entirely. Focusing on
the Supremacy Clause’s text, he asserted that the
phrase ‘‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding’’ is a ‘‘non obstante provision,’’192 that is, a phrase in a new statute
that ‘‘repeal[s] older, potentially conflicting statutes in
the same field.’’193
These non obstante provisions were used at the time
of the Founding, Justice Thomas maintained, as an instruction to courts ‘‘not to apply the general presumption against implied repeals.’’194 Thus, the Constitution’s drafters intended that ‘‘federal law should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting state law.’’195
Under the Supremacy Clause’s non obstante language,
Justice Thomas went on, courts should not ‘‘distort federal law to accommodate conflicting state law,’’ and instead should look to a statute’s ‘‘ordinary meaning.’’196
186

Lohr, 518 at 485 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Bates, 544 U.S. at 449-50; Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); see generally Wyeth, 555 U.S.
at 565 & n.3.
188
Bates, 544 U.S. at 449.
189
Mutual, 133 S. Ct. at 2483 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2840 (majority opinion)) (emphasis added);
see also id. at 2483, 2486.
190
See id. at 2483 n.1.
191
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 623-24 & n.14.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. (quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev.
225, 241-42 (2000)).
195
Id. at 2580.
196
Id. (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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Justice Thomas’s view that only the text of federal
law, and not a presumption against preemption, should
guide implied conflict-preemption analysis builds on his
earlier four-justice dissent in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
where he maintained that the presumption has no place
in construing an express preemption clause.197 Relying
on a dissenting view expressed years earlier by Justice
Scalia,198 Justice Thomas argued in Altria that when
Congress has said that it desires some preemption, and
the only question is its scope, ‘‘[t]he text of the statute
must control.’’199
Taken together, these recent rulings indicate that
four justices—Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—are prepared to ditch the
presumption against preemption in all cases. This
movement represents a significant shift over the last
two decades. For years, the Justices regularly joined
opinions relying on the presumption. Indeed, early in
his Supreme Court tenure, Justice Thomas himself
penned a partial dissent arguing that the Court erroneously had held a state common-law claim preempted in
part because it had not accorded sufficient ‘‘[r]espect
for the presumptive sanctity of state law[.]’’200
Is the presumption dead? For now, the answer likely
depends on Justice Kennedy. In PLIVA, although Justice Kennedy joined the majority’s conclusion that impossibility preemption barred state-law failure-to-warn
claims against generic drug manufacturers, he did not
join Justice Thomas’s plurality, suggesting that he, like
the four dissenters,201 was concerned that Justice
Thomas’s reading of the Supremacy Clause would, if
adopted by a Court majority, kill off the presumption
against preemption.
And in Altria, Justice Kennedy joined the majority
opinion, which invoked the presumption and rejected
Justice Thomas’s dissenting position that it does not apply in express-preemption cases.202 On the other hand,
Justice Kennedy joined the Mutual majority, which, like
the PLIVA majority, found preemption without even a
nod to the presumption. In sum, the preemption remains on life support, but it is not dead yet. Stay tuned.

b. But, it’s fair to ask, does any of this matter? Commentators have noted the inconsistency with which the
presumption is invoked,203 suggesting that the presumption matters little. Others have said more bluntly
197
555 U.S. 70, 98-103 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting,
joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., and Alito, J.).
198
Id. at 98 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 545 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
199
Id. at 103. Justice Thomas’s reliance on text as the sole
basis for express-preemption analysis is consistent with his
view that the ‘‘obstacle’’ or ‘‘purposes and objectives’’ form of
implied preemption is illegitimate because it permits courts to
engage in freewheeling predictions about congressional intent
and ‘‘encourages an overly expansive reading of statutory
text[.]’’ Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
200
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 679
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88,
116-17 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting) (forceful reliance on presumption against preemption joined by Justice Thomas).
201
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2591-92 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
202
Altria, 555 U.S. at 98-103 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203
See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling,
Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas
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that the Court’s preemption doctrine owes far more to
desired results than to principle, with the presumption
serving as something on which to hang one’s judicial
hat when useful.204 The question whether federalism
jurisprudence is governed more by raw politics than
principle is beyond the scope of this article. Focusing
here only on the presumption against preemption, we
believe, for at least two reasons, that the presumption
has some practical importance.
First, it strikes us as unlikely that the presumption’s
four opponents on the Court would have expended so
much effort laying the groundwork for its demise if they
thought it was never outcome-determinative. They have
seen the cases litigated before them and debated within
the Court, and if they thought that the presumption
against preemption never moved its adherents to vote
against preemption, the fight would not be worth it. In
other words, if four Justices think it matters, there’s a
good chance it does matter, at least sometimes.
Second, most preemption cases, including most tort
preemption cases, are not destined for the Supreme
Court. The lower courts, both state and federal, are supposed to adhere to the presumption. Those courts have
been instructed that they have ‘‘a duty to accept the
reading [of a federal statute] that disfavors preemption’’ when the statute is ambiguous,205 and so it is
likely that they will apply the presumption faithfully, at
least as an anti-preemption tie-breaker in cases that
they view as close.

2. Tort Preemption vs. Positive-Law Preemption
a. The majority and dissenting opinions in Mutual
contain discussions of whether federal preemption
questions should be viewed differently if the target of
potential preemption is a state-law remedy that results
only in the payment of damages as opposed to a state
statute or regulation that purports to prohibit conduct
directly. Frequently, this distinction is described as a
difference between state common-law actions, which
typically seek only an award of damages, and state
‘‘positive’’ law—that is, statutes and regulations—which
often (if not always) may be enforced through prohibitions on unlawful conduct.206
These labels, which we will use here for convenience,
are imprecise. On occasion, common-law remedies include injunctions that prohibit conduct, and sometimes
violations of statutes or regulations may be redressed
only by payment of a fine while the violator is free to
continue to break the law. And some states have codified their common law, making tort damages remedies
available by statute. In any event, the distinction we
mean to draw is one between state-law damages remedies and direct prohibitions on conduct.
In his opinion for the Court in Mutual, Justice Alito
was adamant that it was ‘‘impossible’’ simultaneously
to comply with both the federal-law requirements governing labeling and design of generic prescription
drugs and a state-law damages remedy premised on a
the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 63, 78
(2010).
204
See id. at 65 (‘‘Notwithstanding alternative explanations
of the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, the one with the
greatest staying power is that which attributes everything to
ideology and politics.’’) (internal citation omitted).
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duty to label or design the drug differently.207 That view
of impossibility preemption, as noted earlier, is one that
focuses on the claimed conflict between federal requirements and the abstract state-law duty (for instance, the
duty not to market an unreasonably dangerous product).208
The Mutual dissenters, on the other hand, explained
that despite potential tension between federal and state
law, simultaneous compliance with both was not impossible because the state-law remedy was one to pay damages (not actually to change the product’s design or label).209 And, besides, the dissenters said, a defendant
could choose not to sell the product at all (which is not
prohibited by federal law) when faced with a state-law
damages judgment premised on inadequacies in the design or labeling of its product.210
The Mutual majority rejected the latter ‘‘ ‘stopselling’ rationale as incompatible with our pre-emption
jurisprudence.’’211 The majority firmly held that ‘‘the
mere fact that a manufacturer may avoid liability by
leaving the market does not defeat a claim of impossibility.’’212 Thus, absent a re-evaluation of this holding
that might come with a change in the Court’s composition, the stop-selling argument appears dead, at least in
the impossibility-preemption context.

b. But what of the argument that impossibility does
not occur in the tort preemption context because a
manufacturer confronting a state-law damages verdict
can always just pay the verdict and continue to sell the
product? The Mutual majority rejected that argument
on the ground that common-law remedies and remedies
for violations of positive-law obligations ‘‘do precisely
the same thing.’’213 Faced with either remedy, Justice
Alito suggested, the manufacturer of the offending
product can simply pay the money demanded for violating the state-law norm (whether in the form of a governmental fine or a damages verdict) and continue to
market the product. As we now explain, that view overstates the Court’s prior preemption doctrine and fails to
come to grips with the practical differences between
damages liability and direct government regulation.
We turn first to preemption doctrine. Has the Supreme Court embraced the idea that positive state regulation and a jury’s award of damages are equivalent?
Sometimes yes, and sometimes no.
The Court’s first statement on this topic came in San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.214 Garmon
involved a business’s attempt to prevent union picketing through a suit under California law for an injunction
and damages. In an earlier stage of the litigation, the
Supreme Court held that the injunctive relief was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.215 In Garmon, the Court also rejected the attempt to impose
damages under California law, explaining that ‘‘[state]
regulation can be as effectively exerted through an
207
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award of damages as through some form of preventive
relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing
conduct and controlling policy.’’216
Garmon was not a products liability case, and federal
labor law, unlike most federal statutes that regulate
consumer products and services, authorizes monetary
and other remedies. Thus, Garmon presented a situation distinguishable from cases such as Mutual and
PLIVA and other recent tort preemption cases that have
reached the Supreme Court, where the relevant federal
regulatory scheme did not provide a means to compensate people harmed by federally regulated products.
Nonetheless, it is easy to see why modern preemptionseeking defendants would rely heavily on Garmon. Its
exclusive focus on damages as a regulatory, rather than
a compensatory, tool is useful to defendants seeking to
equate positive law with tort law. Whenever positive
state law is preempted, they argue, so is state-law damages liability.
But even after Garmon, the prevailing assumption remained that state regulatory standards and state tort
law or other state compensation schemes occupied
separate spheres, with the latter largely unaffected by
federal preemption.217 The best example is probably
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,218 where the Court
considered whether an Ohio administrative agency
could, consistent with federal preemption principles,
award additional workers’ compensation benefits based
on violations of state safety standards at a federally
owned, privately operated nuclear production facility.
The Court held that the additional award was not preempted. Acknowledging that state positive-law safety
requirements might be preempted, the Court viewed
damages liability as fundamentally different:
Congress’ reluctance to allow direct state regulation of federal projects says little about whether Congress was likewise concerned with the incidental regulatory effects arising from the enforcement of a workers’ compensation law,
like Ohio’s, that provides an additional award when the injury is caused by the breach of a safety regulation. The effects of direct regulation on the operation of federal projects are significantly more intrusive than the incidental
regulatory effects of such an additional award provision.
Appellant may choose to disregard Ohio safety regulations
and simply pay an additional workers’ compensation award
if an employee’s injury is caused by a safety violation. We
believe Congress may reasonably determine that incidental
regulatory pressure is acceptable, whereas direct regulatory authority is not.219

Until the 1990s, the Supreme Court had never held a
state-law tort claim preempted by federal regulation, at
least not where the federal law itself did not provide a
right of action for damages. In 1992, the Court began to
change course. A plurality opinion in a tobacco liability
case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.220 relied on the

language from Garmon quoted above, and concluded
that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
which requires specific warnings on cigarette packages,
preempted some (but not all) tort claims based on a failure to warn about the dangers of smoking.221 Since
then, defendants in tort preemption cases have relied
on this language from Garmon and Cipollone in an effort to show that state tort law and state positive law
have the same regulatory effect, that is, that the two are
inherently the same.
But the Court has continued to send contradictory
signals. In the majority portion of the Cipollone decision, which addressed the preemptive effect of an earlier, 1965 version of the cigarette labeling law, just a
few paragraphs above the plurality’s endorsement of
Garmon, the same justice who wrote the plurality (Justice Stevens) said something quite different: that the
1965 Act, because of its particular wording, preempts
‘‘only positive enactments by legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate particular warning labels,’’
and ‘‘not . . . common-law damages actions.’’222 In responding to the tobacco industry’s arguments that the
1965 Act was preemptive, the Court seemed to reject
the Garmon principle as a general, overarching justification for preemption:
There is no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued
vitality of state common-law damages actions.223

The internal tension evident in Cipollone was carried
over to Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,224 a case involving
claimed preemption of a tort suit by the federal
medical-device law. There, a four-Justice plurality suggested that a rational Congress could treat state
common-law duties damages actions differently from
positive state law,225 while dissenters and a concurring
Justice appeared to equate the two as a general proposition.226
And, finally, Garmon’s tort-as-regulation viewpoint
cannot be squared with another important tort preemption case, Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine.227 There, a
boater had died tragically when she fell overboard and
was struck by the boat’s propeller blades. One of the
questions presented in Sprietsma was whether a state
common-law duty premised on a boat manufacturer’s
failure to install a propeller guard was preempted by
the Federal Boat Safety Act’s express preemption provision, which the manufacturer claimed preempted all
positive law and all common law regarding boat safety.
The Court rejected that argument, maintaining that it
is ‘‘perfectly rational’’ for Congress to preempt state
positive law, but not ‘‘common-law claims, which—
unlike most administrative and legislative regulations—
necessarily perform an important remedial role in compensating accident victims.’’228 This statement is important because tort law’s ability to compensate is one way
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that tort law and most regulatory requirements indisputably are not the same.

c. Having shown that the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine has both embraced and rejected the claim
that positive law and tort law have the same purpose
and effect, we turn to the question whether the claim
makes real-world, empirical sense. In our view, it does
not.
It is a significant leap from the proposition endorsed
in Garmon that tort law is meant to and does to some
degree have regulatory effect on defendants’ future behavior to the proposition that its impact is equivalent to
direct, positive-law regulation. Although this point can
be illustrated by reference to most state or federal regulatory schemes, we use FDA as an example because its
regulations were at issue in Mutual, PLIVA, and Wyeth.
If FDA wants to get a food, drug, or device off the
market, it can do so swiftly. If FDA determines that a
product is misbranded because its labels create a hazard for consumers, it would not seek only payment of a
fine to the government, which would do nothing to protect current consumers. Rather, it would insist on
changes to the label or the product’s removal from the
market. The Mutual majority understood this basic
point when it acknowledged that a misbranded product
may no longer be sold in interstate commerce.229
Thus, if FDA determines that a product is misbranded, it can obtain an injunction to halt its sale,230
and even seize products if need be,231 as former FDA
Commissioner David Kessler did with misbranded orange juice when he first took office.232 We recognize
that state and federal agencies often do not exercise
their full regulatory authority because of indifference,
insufficient resources, lack of political will, or ‘‘capture’’ by the regulated industry. Our point here, however, is that positive-law authority often gives those
regulators the ability to quickly alter the conduct of the
regulated industry.
Contrast these direct regulatory powers with the tort
system. Most prominently, damages are the only form
of relief available in the types of tort suits that regularly
populate the Supreme Court’s preemption docket. For
people like Ms. Bartlett, who have already been hurt,
and are no longer using the product, it is damages or
nothing.
Moreover, large industry players generally react very
slowly, and sometimes not at all, to liability pressures.
Most instances of liability are absorbed without any
change in manufacturer conduct of the kind that can be
obtained swiftly by a regulator. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, after the imposition of damages liability, the defendant is never legally compelled to alter its
future conduct.233
Thus, to the extent that tort law exerts regulatory effect against a drug manufacturer generally, the effect
occurs only after repeated suits, settlements, and findings of liability, and, even then, the cause-and-effect re229
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lationship is rarely clear (which is hardly the case when
a regulator takes products off retailers’ shelves). The
Supreme Court stated this well in Goodyear Atomic,
when it said that ‘‘the effects of direct state regulation
on the operation of federal government are significantly
more intrusive than the incidental regulatory effects of
state [compensation] law.’’234
Of course, there is some symbiosis between direct
regulation and damages liability, as the regulatory system imposes pressures on the tort system and vice
versa. Both exert financial and political pressure on industry and government, and both are capable of making public information that would otherwise stay locked
away in corporate file cabinets. But some interaction
and overlap between the tort and regulatory systems do
not alter our basic position: Preemption doctrine should
not be built on a claim of equivalency between direct
regulation and damages liability because the equivalency does not exist—that is, the claim does not reflect
reality on the ground.

d. But none of this matters if Mutual definitively has
held otherwise. We do not think it has. Compared to its
clear rejection of the stop-selling rationale, the Mutual
majority’s consideration of the positive-law/commonlaw distinction was less emphatic and more ambiguous.
First, Justice Alito began his discussion by noting that
‘‘the distinction between common law and statutory law
is irrelevant to the argument at hand,’’235 a reference to
Justice Sotomayor’s statement that application of New
Hampshire tort law in the case had not ‘‘impose[d] any
actual ‘legal obligation,’ ’’236 suggesting that the majority was not making an all-encompassing pronouncement for tort preemption cases generally.
Second, the Mutual majority said that state commonlaw remedies and direct state regulation ‘‘do precisely
the same thing’’ because ‘‘[t]hey require a manufacturer to choose between leaving the market and accepting the consequences of its actions (in the form of a fine
or other sanction).’’237 This statement suggests that a
manufacturer has the same freedom of choice in responding to either a jury verdict or a regulator’s edict.
To be sure, in both situations, the manufacturer can voluntarily leave the market. But, as we have noted, the final result of state regulatory enforcement often is not
payment of money (or at least not only payment of
money) but a prohibition on the underlying offending
conduct. That is, the ‘‘other sanction’’ referred to by
Justice Alito may be the product’s forced departure
from the market, and if the state were to impose that
sanction, the manufacturer would have no choice at all.
This latter point is important because when a state requires the removal from the market of a product that
the federal government has approved, there is far
greater potential for interference with federal regulatory objectives than if the product remains on the market and the manufacturer pays for the injuries that the
product has caused.238 The latter scenario may increase
the cost of the product to a small degree, but it does not
make the product unavailable to consumers, which
might be a concern to federal regulators.
234
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The Mutual majority confronted none of this. Its discussion of the tort-direct regulation distinction is brief
and undeveloped, and if the Court had intended to put
tort-preemption and regulatory-preemption cases on
equal footing for all time, we would have expected it at
least to have considered its prior discussions of the issue in cases such as Cipollone and Goodyear Atomic.
Finally, as noted earlier, the Mutual majority acknowledged that Congress expressly preempted state
regulatory requirements for over-the-counter drugs
while exempting from preemption product-liability
suits against their manufacturers,239 including manu239
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facturers of generic over-the-counter drugs, for whom,
like the generic prescription drug manufacturers in Mutual and PLIVA, unilateral changes to drug labeling and
design are impermissible. This acknowledgement suggests that the Court understands that the impact of state
positive law and state-law damages liability are not inherently the same and that allowing the latter while preempting the former may not undermine federal regulatory objectives.
In sum, we think that Mutual’s off-hand statement
that tort remedies and direct regulation do ‘‘the same
thing’’ may fade away when the Court again is presented with the issue and has the opportunity to treat it
with more care.
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